It has been said that I am against medical philosophy. This is a misrepresentation of my position.
In an article in the journal (1) I am said to be against the enterprise of medical philosophy, and opposed to its inclusion in teaching programmes in medical schools. This is a serious misrepresentation of my position, and I would like to put the record straight.
Toon describes my position thus: I am part of a movement which is expressing disquiet about the achievements and future of 'medical philosophy or bioethics'. My specific contribution to this movement is: 'to argue that the sooner medical ethicists cease to exist the better'. More generally, since I am part of a movement which has 'common strands' I am also said (a) to think that academic standards in 'bioethics' are often poor (which I do), (b) to believe that philosophical analysis cannot solve the problems of ethical decision-making in medicine (I think quite the opposite, philosophical analysis is the only way to solve some of them), and (c) that doctors should not be trained in applied ethics but instead need to be made more 'morally virtuous' (a point I neither make nor comprehend).
Despite the brevity of the article to which he refers (it is only a little over two pages in length) Toon 'There are only two real choices for ethics experts who believe that doctors must receive a general education, and who wish to change medical training accordingly. They must either refuse to teach medical ethics at all, or if they decide to teach under this label must genuinely aim to make themselves redundant as ethicists as soon as possible (since they do not have a subject, and do not wish to sustain a deluding system)' (2).
Finally, I recommended that:
'The aim of enhancing general thinking about health care activity is to refuse to take a specialised focus and instead to encourage students to think critically, drawing on as much relevant theory and evidence as possible, in order to resolve difficulties of intervention. 'What is important is that medical students are enabled to become critical analysts and to know where and how to find ways ahead for themselves. If this broad approach is seen to have merit then the new generation of doctors will want to stitch in such methods to their own teaching, since they will recognise that every medical decision has a mixture of components, and that the best answers can be found only by a deliberative process which involves the range of factors.
'Instead of adding yet another specialism to the flagrantly overcrowded undergraduate curriculum, those with power to change medical education should be aiming to find room and respect for generalist teachers' (2).
What I most definitely did not say is that we should 'rely on a vague confidence that a new generation of moral generalists will emerge'. I am not hoping for doctors to become 'moral generalists', but all-round problem-solvers who are aware of the conceptual and practical limits of their craft.
What is more, having worked in three medical schools over a period of nine years, I am well aware that changes never 'emerge' but must always be fought for, and that any developments must be carefully planned, explained and justified. If the changes I propose are to happen then very precise job descriptions will be necessary. I very much doubt that advertisements for 'generalist teachers' will appear, but I would hope to see new medical school posts in such subjects as 'health philosophy', 'health care history' and 'medical law'.
So how has Peter Toon managed to misunderstand so much? No doubt there are several possible explanations but I suggest that the problem may well have been caused by his own experience as a medical undergraduate (when there were very few if any 'generalist teachers'). The main point of my article was to argue that it would be a good idea if medical students were to be offered a more philosophical education, and not just introduced to the dramatic dilemmas (3) 
